Who is Abu Khaled al Suri?
Abu Khaled al Suri was born 1963 in Aleppo. He was known as Sheikh Umayr, but his real name is Muhammed el Bahai. Abu Khaled al Suri took part within the islamist opposition in the 70s and 80s, and left Syria after the Hama incidents. After his years in Algeria and Afghanistan, Abu Khaled al Suri returned back to Syria and joined the Syrian opposition in 2011. He took part in the formation of Ahrar al Sham. Abu Khaled al Suri was killed on 23 February 2014 by an allegedly Daesh attack against the leadership of Ahrar al Sham.
How we attained his diary?
I attained part of the diary of Abu Khaled al Suriy via a Syrian opposition fighter who wanted to remain autonomous for the safety of himself and his family.
Additionally I have to say that this is only a part of the diary of Abu Khaled al Suri. I received a handwritten copy of his original diary, and therefore hasn’t received the original diary handwritten by Abu Khaled Suri himelf. With my work, this text will be firstly published, and translated into Arabic and English.
By publishing this, I hope to provide additional information about Ahrar al Sham, the political view of Abu Khaled al Suri and his view and relations to Al-Qaeda. I hope that this will contribute to the literature.B
To read the original in Arabic click here.
First: Absence of strategy and comprehensive pre-planning
The early Mujahideen did not have the right vision to establish the military jihadi line, ie, a strategic vision based on an accurate calculation of the facts and expectations of the future, and it was not taken into consideration as a serious study of the country’s situation, geography, demographic geography, religious, national and political structure, And the nature of the regime and hostile and friendly forces and their data, and the possibility of benefiting from them to the other important things that should have been taken into account, and based on the nature of the appropriate military action, and the nature of the structure of the organization required ….. etc.
On the contrary, the work prevailed almost instinctively in which necessities were always determined according to the facts of the status quo, and soon emerged from the hands of planners once the events had been exploaded, and the events dragged their planners through a series of necessities and choose the lesser evil. When the matter came out of the hands of the forefront and became in the hand of the leadership of the outside, and it was not a part of the unplanned work less than the previous stage, despite the availability of time and possibilities and circumstances and support of the dialogue, the leadership was unable to lead and to work to the strategic level, but on the contrary it (the leadership) relied on the income data and built its dreams of resolution on them, and missed the strategy even on the preparation and training programs, and maybe the people of insid (and we mean: the field leadership) Hama, Damascus and the officers were the first to think of giving the work a strategic curve, but their fatal mistake was thier relying on the external factors and its supporting, drove them out of the game, and threw them into the destruction. And because of the absence of this strategic important action in the planning of a revolutionary guerrilla war, the events have been controlled by the effectiveness of all military attempts, and despite all the wonderful individual tournaments it was led to the failure of the Mujahideen, and they could not do anything but only give evidence of their ability to martyrdom.
Second: The fragmentation of the loyal Mujahideen in various organizations and various loyalties
It was is very late to understand the issue, and we are still somewhat far from correcting it and pushing it to its normal path. This is perhaps the first duty to establish a distinctive jihadist line. The scene was filled by the factor of principles, regulations and loyalties between those who struggled through a prior perception and those who had been pushed into it out of fear and disbelief and those who had been compelled to go back to it … etc, and that leads to the presence of a complex human form in the rules of the organizations that have become concerned with this matter … Unfortunately, the true Mujahideen themselves have also split in this context. Thus the Mujahideen found themselves believing in the revolutionary Jihadist armed action, and in the same time into a various organizations and under various leaders, which make them loose the (echo) of this believing flame in the people who carry it, and the concentration of effort in one curve. It has gone beyond this, because the struggles and the sad atmosphere sometimes resulted in an atmosphere of shipments and partisan hatred even among the youth Mujahideen who hold the same thought and the same spirit and the same goal, and that only because of their presence under the leadership of different stripes of conflicting objectives. and above this differentiate of fragmentation of religious and moral negative reflections, in many ways, it leads to be a strategic factor that is not enough to benefit from.
Thirdly, the inability to explain a revolutionary jihadist theory and a clear set of ideological goals:
“The establishment of Islamic rule and the war against Nusairis” it was the slogan of all those who were found in a conglomeration of Islamic blocs that became involved in this conflict. One of the first axioms that must be used is a revolutionary organization that addresses the leadership of the masses, Unfortunately, the true Mujahideen failed to put such a thought, goal, and slogan in a clear and deliberate direction through a media plan (clear), at least so that (those who perish would perish by clear evidence, and those who survive would survive by clear evidence). It was the best that had been understood by the masses, or by those who only cared about the events, there is a group of young Islamists fighting this regime and most of them understood that they want to establish an Islamic rule, Without addressing the understanding of what forms this provision? And why this war was for? What is the extent of its hypothesis? And why do they call for participation and death in its path? The Mujahideen could not exactly make the people understand who they were? What do they want? And what motivates them? (On the contrary, those who spied on this movement and the revolution, first thing they did was that they came out to show people what they want and what their goals are … etc, like the parties of the National Alliance, for example …) Although this explanation was and remains the basis of attracting the masses and mobilizing the rules of intellectual and doctrinal payment for this dangerous work.
Fourth: the shallow political and revolutionary awareness and the low level of forensic science as a whole
With the exception of some members of the Mujahideen leadership and some of the bases, most of those who responded to this fierce revolutionary war were characterized by a low level of political awareness of the dimensions of this revolutionary game. Because the imperfection is impermissible in the rules, its danger gets greater and greater when it becomes one of the characteristics of the leadership of the labor administration, and thus the ignorance of the nature of this revolutionary act of purely political substance, as the war in all its details is nothing but a tool for this revolutionary political direction adopted by the work. The ignorance of this matter leaves the leadership unable to develope any scheme of an integrated strategic nature at all levels, and even the rules and the leaders of the middle levels of peoples should gain the understanding because it is that will decide the future leaders in a way that consumes its cadres step by step, and because their understanding of this matter explains the justification of the leadership in the development of their perceptions, and makes them call for a greater path that this awareness of this concept was shallow, and rarely demonstrated by individuals who have walked this path at various levels.
The level of forensic science in general, especially in the Mujahideen bases, and after the disasters of successive citations of the elite segment of the elite Mujahideen in the first shock, and the Islamic groups have relied on the quantitative mobilization of individuals. And this level became low, which leads to the first role in those conspiracies that passed easily, and could control these rules, which became the tongue that recognizes the delivery and confidence of some of the men working in it; where they understand what we do not understand, and therefore many abuses occurred, and many plots passed under this ignorance Semi-mass. In short, the majority of these Mujahideen were distinguished by the rush and the stalemate. This is true, but the level of awareness on the scientific and legal level was shallow, and far less than what must be found in the ranks of revolutionary jihadi groups.
Fifth: relying on quantity after the first strike went by the elites:
For the vanguard and the Mujahideen of the inside, the first shock, from the 1970s to the late 1980s, took them in a tragic series of citations. Therefore, those leaders were implicated in opening the door of organizing in front of the masses to expand their base. The quantity exceeded the genre and negative and fatal phenomena emerged later; Because many of those who joined the path were not deeply rooted in the path of stability and Islamic commitment. They were characterized only by the enthusiasm and the rush that followed the decline of events, especially going out of the boarders…
On the level of the Muslim Brotherhood, the blow of arrests has gone with the beginning of the bombing of the events of thousands of cadres that had been prepared in the education and training corners, and opened the door after their departure outside the borders in front of polarization and assimilation of every slices of the community, which showed signs unclear in the ranks of some rules, and unfortunate and shameful signs in some separate incidents.
The negative of this quantitative buildup had been icreased by the situation inside the country that has not been conducive to the preparation of these masses, raising them and raising their scientific, legal and political standing, and preparing them appropriately, but necessarily. On the other hand, the failure of the Brotherhood in terms of education and preparation was no less than their failure on the level of military action, and despite the survival of hundreds of elements in the bases, the leadership has not succeeded in preparing a successful educational program at the level of the case except for the boring classic Islamic party lessons that had been held every now and then.
And some theoretical military training programs were insufficient, not to mention that the atmosphere of the quantitative crowd of Syrian intelligence has made it possible for agents to enter the atmosphere of conflict in order to push the enemy and attract the elements that the organizations obtained.
Sixth: The weakness of the internal and external media of the Mujahideen:
We have already talked about the failure of the Mujahideen in crystallizing an idea that people understand by a set of goals and slogans that they were aware of in their work. This was a part of their media failure, with the exception of certain statements that were set for specific purposes. There was no planned media plan to mobilize the masses and expand the revolutionary base of the supporters.
As leadership of the Brotherhood abroad took over, the media had been neglected on a foreign scale, but was involved in intimidation and culminated in the accompanying of Hama events and the prognosticate of the (preacher)[i], and it was more news media than intellectual media directed to invade the hearts of supporters at home and abroad.
The result of such shortcomings is not hidden on the foresight, the failure to make the rivers of blood run in vain, despite the existence of thousands of loyalists, and reaping only the epithets of martyrdom. The lesson of the failure of the jihadist media was an unforgettable lesson.
Seventh: the Mujahedeen waiting for support from outside parties continuously, and not relying on self confıdence:
That was a complete line destroyed the vanguard inside, then it destroyed the Mujahideen crowd abroad, and then destroyed the field command and the military administration officers in Hama and Damascus (what was called: plan of decisiveness). All those involved in the jihadist administration have been involved in relying on hostile regimes in the neighborhood (such as Iraq).
The revolution expanded and widened and its costs increased in a cancerous manner, that ecceded the transient flow of the neighborhood of money, weapons and supplies, as happened to the vanguard and then to the leadership of Hama and the officers, and the tragedy that took place was one of the greatest lessons. A revolutionary jihadist movement and a comprehensive guerrilla war can not rely on funding and arming its members and dependents except on themselves, and what they draw from their borders. They must lay out plans for this matter in a clear and detailed manner. Otherwise, it will become a political playing card in the hands of others. It was a hard lesson came to be understood late, and to be considered!
Eighth: The Involvement in a form of long-term guerrilla warfare does not suit the country:
Perhaps this is one of the mistakes of non-strategic planning, or never planning rather, and develop perceptions based on the daughters of pure ideas, its readiness from reality and its facts. The insight into the nature of the country, its geography, its demographic geography, the composition of the religious, ethnic and psychological population, and the knowledge and study of the status and structure of the sectarian sectarian system are sufficient for the student to take a military plan with this hostile regime, and to adopt a method other than that which was adopted and followed by those who do not consider first by their experiences, and the experience of others.
It was sufficient and possible at one time and with the onset of events to topple the regime through targeted strikes aimed at its main pillars and active personalities, and some successful operations have proved the possibility. In the aftermath of the assassination attempt on the President twice – the bombing of the Council of Ministers – Admiral Air – artillery, on the contrary, the Mujahideen began to involve themselves in a long-term war whıch was unequal, a war of attrition between poor, weak and strong rich in the country of the maze, it was one of the results of the work that was not studied, Non-strategic, and another lesson in that sad series of lessons.
Ninth: the long-term transition and the loss and supply of the masses, and the religious and revolutionary low level of individuals:
The reasons and nature of transition from the country were varıed, ranging from escape from crawling to necessity and all according to the situation and this is not the area of our research here.
But the transfer of jihadist staffs to the outside, and the arrange for their lives in the House of the Diaspora and Rabat, especially in Iraq and Jordan or abandoned the entire arena of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Europe lost the revolution friction with the masses, and thus cut off the natural periods of material and human potential and moral turned into a very small isolated body in the phase of erosion, All the levels, the loss of elements that are not compensated through the military operations carried out from the outside to the inside is a form of erosion, and the despirateof some of the Mujahideen and their migration to the arena of Rabat, and the preparation to search for their lives ler to their corrosion .. Etc.
Little by little, Dar al-Hijra has become a living place, not an exceptional stage,the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood contributed greatly to the establishment of this painful situation and drew many of its members to study or work and marriage. At one time it was not in the foreseeable future to develop a plan to return the Mujahideen inside through the program thoughtfully, the vanguard themselves have been involved in this to a great extent. And that the general trend for all was the stability of all those who came out of the Mujahideen, and the affected members of them abroad, and arranged his life there as a long life.
Tenth: The lack of benefit from the experiences of Islamic and global guerrilla wars:
History is full of experiences, sciences and human experiences, all based on the human balance of the total activities of this organism in various fields. Wars and revolutionaries do not differ from this rule. For this and other reasons, the Qur’an and the Sunnah have propelled us in this logical direction, to seek knowledge and extrapolating of the true lesson …
The period after the tragedy has allowed us to demand and learn about rich Islamic and international experiences and researches. Islamic and non-Islamic peoples have gone through similar conditions to which we have passed and written important books and studies. If they had been briefed by some of the authorities, they would not be involved into similar pitfalls.
This was a form of ignorance that characterized our people. Most of our people do not read or clearly look. Many things were handled in a random and random way, while there were many rich experiences of Muslim and non-Muslim nations, studied and codified and accessibled to those who wanted to know and learn. But no onehad clearly seen, and we had to pass in this maze to discover ourselves even the simplest bumps, and we wished that we wake up and learn from experience.
Eleventh: Dealing with systems as a permanent dam:
Twelveth: Public action abroad
It was a serious mistake of a double losing result, we were at home managing our battle as an organization or as secret organizations depending on the fact and battle, and as soon as we went to the neighborhood, the situation changed dramatically, and without any cause! Almost all the organizations have been transformed into public action under the host regimes. It is true that these regimes (hostile in reality) would not accept our hospitality as hidden secret gatherings without understanding a minimum of what we do and what we want, but much public conduct was indispensable.
The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in this, especially in Iraq and Jordan, has gone to far limits, such as revealing our numbers, the names of our members, our intentions, our capabilities and our plans, as well as in other areas where these fleeing crowds did not practice any kind of secrecy. These were the most dangerous secrets, Its owners know with certainty that they have been observed and even sometimes they speak to the observer.
It was a certain madness! But in those circumstances no one was listening to the wise opinion! So we gave the neighboring enemy systems full detailed information about us in everything.
Everything and no need to count! They had introduced us to our truth, underestimated us, and knew how to surround us and participate in our strangulation, And the security coordination that took place at some stages between Jordan, Syria and Iraq, and so on, was not hidden of anyone. On the other hand, we stabbed the other Islamic organizations in the neighboring countries, where their intelligence services who were interested In the war of fundamentalist Islamic terrorists, they took a great lesson and learned how to fight them and direct strikes through their study of the movement of their peers, even their peers, and no power except with God Almighty.
Thirteenth: The external military failure, and loss of ability to deter the enemy and its friends:
While in the interior, the vanguard did not have any time or any possibility of thinking about any foreign military action, and after they went abroad they partly thought about this, and then dismissed, the brothers have formed this by claiming a device independent of the external work device, but it was dead like other devices because of a loss of intention to work.
Elderly disable sheikhs control the electricity of all appliances, and they cut it into maturity. The failure of those involved in this matter to give it the right, caused the regime to be greedy of us, and pushed it to the point of besieging us and banding in our ranks, and directing teams of assassinations and monitoring from time to time to monitor our leaders and those who were active among us, and even went to kill some of our members and effectiveness abroad! In front of the hearing and sight of the whole world! There was no example, no plan or intention to deter the enemy abroad. It was true that the battlefield was Syria, but such a deterrent capability was necessary even in our new home.
On the other hand, many of the Arab, Islamic and other regimes have claimed us by supporting our enemy materially, morally and informally! It was sufficent that at the time when we were suffering from the killing and destruction and the horrors of war, Arab oil money has been treacherous flowing on our Nusairi ASSAD to turn into shots penetrating the hearts of our Muslim nation and to build blocks of oppressive prisons and injustice where our symptoms were violated!
Billions of dollars from The Gulf Islamic countries has poured into the occupied Nusairi regime, which has unanimously agreed of all of the Gulf’s scholars and wisemen … but it was the interests, andthat needed to be solved and detered even by threatening!, but it did not happen. There have been balances of forces and interests did not belong to the jihad must be taken into account! And so was the contradiction and the lesson because the Mujahideen had no power to deter! …
Fourteenth: Absence of any perception of the stage after the fall of the regime if it happened by us or by others:
This was one of the results of unstudied planning or of no-planning, rather. We were fighting an enemy controlled by the existence of intertwined factors, some international and some regional and some internal … It could have fallen by us or the act of others … And this would create a new circumstance which was not taken into concideration, and no longer has any plan or any vision, so, what about those who do not know how to plan for the post-war! But it was another lesson that must be taken into account: how our position will be towards a sudden coup … towards a sudden fall … how will we deal with the neighborhood, with the blocs, with the groups, with the distribution of our required forces, etc. There was no such a thing to be taken into account.
Fifteenth: Not to circumvent the faithful and sincere scholars and benefit them:
This was a mistake on both sides of the Mujahideen and the scholars. The scholars of that time have turned their backs on this path and covered up in their private retreat, especially in Saudi Arabia, as if nothing had been left, and they left the determinations in the hands of halve and quarter of scholars, and those who do not belong to the forensic science have to deal with the leadership of the Islamic Movement and Jihad.
The Mujahideen did not give this matter enough attention to the scholars, enlightened in their opinion, working with their advice and giving them their right, so it was a compromise on both sides and a close relationship between the scholar and the worker … The arena has been free of working scientists, and it was necessary to unify the effort of the scholar and the worker,i.e, the trusted scholar and the sincerly worker, but none of this has happened, and the path has deviated, the transgressions have occurred, and the ignorant have been awakened to this fatal error, and perhaps the time is enough for reform.
Sixteenth: Not benefiting from all the Islamic sectors in the country in terms of mobilization in the revolution, especially the tribes of the desert and the Kurds:
It was naturally an Islamic revolution of universal and comprehensive goals, meaning every Muslim in this country, and since the extension of the invitation is an extension of concentration, not horizontally .. In the sense that it focused in cities and sectors limited social segments and did not spread throughout the arena, this reflected negatively on the jihadist movement And neglected important sectors that could be entered into the battle and crucially all were Muslim sectors committed to some extent and sympathetic to Islam, especially the surrounding countryside in the cities, tribes in the desert, and Kurds in the north, Thus the Mujahideen failed to mobilize these sectors, and the state was able to recruit most of them through seduction, threat and low interests. And others, especially our Kurdish Muslim brothers, have fallen prey to the deviant ideas of the expatriate to achieve their identity, which is denied by all the oppressive unjust society … We have lost a strong public support, and it was one of the successful lessons not to study the arena and management from its data and planning comprehensively for it…
Seventeenth: The inability to turn the Islamic civil and advocacy organizations into military capable of resistance and self-defense organizations:
It is perhaps the most important lesson that mean our brothers in the advocacy organizations in the Islamic and Arab Countries. The battle has exploded somewhat abruptly, but a large segment of the Islamists, especially the leadership, knew that this battle was inevitable and those great leaders did not take any preparation or planning. Those cadres were the victims of the arrest. The cadres who had survived failed in mobilizing themselves as military combat cadres. They carried with them all the peaceful mosque methods apply to the military action, and the faılure of the scholarwas very huge as he wore the uniform of the commandant .
It is strange to see and hear organizations raising the banner of jihad and death in the name of ALLAH, which is the greatest of its aspirations, and leave its bases over decades of education and training unable to take up arms! Failed to prepare even a travel document for a sudden disaster, and to return saving dirham for a difficult day. It was a weak sheep gatherings that soon came to the butcher’s knife, And for the next few years, the failure of the possibility of mobilizing such a class has proved a sudden and rapid military mobilization … This is a lesson … a lesson for all the Islamic organizations that leave Jihad and wait for the day of the incident to reconsider their structure and composition, and the extent of their readiness for that day, or let them declare rest and moderation, not growing on themselves and the Muslims, and then provide those thousands of victims who trusted Sheikh to the junta or detained under the slogan: (the seventyest)
Eighteen: Along with those harsh lessons we had some useful lesson:
The events proved the possibility of mobilizing the Muslim masses in favor of a jihadist Islamic revolution, in condition of providing the example and good example of sacrifice and courage and proof of the ability to fight tyranny, and a year and a half of military jihad in a relationship carried hundreds of thousands of Muslims to go out to the streets calling for the life of jihad and Islam and the fall of the regime and tyranny, and the demand for weapons to participate in the honor of jihad, and the experience of Hama proved that the thousands of Muslims responded to the call of jihad and fought side by side with our Mujahideen brothers …
Also, events had proved that our people are benevolent people, soon the leadership of the Mujahideen, which emerged from within the people, and distinguished military cadres on the command and soldier level, reached the ranks of this people, which the puppet authorities forcibly removed from gun and manhood and Islamic equestrian morality. , And a review in the records of our heroes and martyrs may ALLAH bless and accept them assures thıs point … This is a unique successor in the Muslim generous people, and a hope in ALLAH and then in a future of a similar tender.
 . Anfal suresi (42)
. ıt was anewspaper for the Syrian Muslims Brotherhood organization