This interview was conducted by Ömer Özkizilcik First of all, can you please introduce yourself? Nebih Musa Taha Abu Salih. I am a farmer who was graduated from high school. I am of Kurdish origin, one of the Aleppo Kurds. I am from the Kurdish Didi tribe in the Azaz region. I am the head of the tribe. Our tribe consists of around 40-45 thousand people. I am also presiding the Community for Syrian Kurdish tribes encompassing all the Kurdish people around Syria. Besides, I am the founding chairman of the Independent Kurdish Council. What is the Independent Kurdish Council? It was founded on the first day of 2020. We established this council at the request of the Kurdish people. Our council is located only in liberated areas. When we looked at other people living in the liberated regions, we felt the need to establish this Independent Kurdish Council with the belief that the Kurdish people did not receive the same services and facilities. In general, organizations and NGOs that have been established for Kurds until now, only exploit the Kurdish people. Numerous Kurdish formations did not benefit the Kurdish people for nine years because they were close to the Syrian regime. Such organizations and parties only enforce the agendas of the states that support them. They have no ties to the Kurdish people. Based on this, we have established this council in line with their wishes by believing that this Independent Kurdish Council is necessary. We also wanted to send the following message to the World: Most of the Kurds are not PKK sympathizers. PKK cannot solely represent the Kurds. We are here too. Kurds are patriots as well. We are a formation that defends and protects the interests of the Syrian Kurds. Of course, our first and foremost goal is to fight against those who claim to represent Kurds such as PKK, YPG or SDG. They survive under the cover of SDG. We are fighting against such parties. In this way, we are fighting against them and our fight against all kinds of separatists like them will continue. We fought during the liberation of Afrin. Now we have our military group and this military group is one of the components of SNA. Now we have a very strong bond with our brothers in Turkey. We have an office where we are constantly in contact with our Turkish brothers. Especially, during the liberation of Afrin, Olive Branch Operation and Peace Spring Operation, our Turkish brothers offered us very special opportunities. Together with our Turkish brothers, we gave martyrs in our lands. The blood of our martyrs is now mixed. I herewith would like to address all PKK and separatist terrorist organizations: We have a very important and unbreakable bond with our Turkish brothers. We share this with everyone here that the PKK is a terrorist organization. We must fight against them. As patriotic Kurds, we have to fight against the PKK. We want to emphasize that we consider Turkey’s enemy is our enemy. Our common point is that the PKK is a terrorist organization. Turkey is in a good relationship with us. Either the state or the government. Where are the independent Kurdish Parliament locations, how many people are there and the Kurdish military structure you are talking about is the Kurdish Hawks Brigade under the Hamza Division? Yes, the Kurdish Hawks Brigade under Firka Hamza. The founding members of the council are 41 people. All of them are Kurds with high education levels. We will have a congress sometime soon with the founding members and the management team. We expect that thousands are going to attend the congress. Our council is constantly developing. The number I gave is the founding commission required for the establishment of the council. Insha’Allah we will declare to the whole world in the following congress that we are brothers with all the people here including Arabs, Turkmen, and all ethnicities. PKK’s current ideology continuously demonstrates Arab and Turkish people as enemies to Kurds. In this congress, we will declare that we are brothers and we will give the message of brotherhood. The PKK constantly sows seeds of hatred and hostility among our societies. There are some formations and parties close to the PKK, and they express similar views and opinions. The PKK always carries the same thoughts and ideology regardless of time and location, it tries to plant hatred and hostility seeds among our societies. There are three flags on the emblem of the Independent Kurdish Council. It has the free Syrian flag, the Turkish flag, and the Kurdistan flag. Why did you make such a choice? These flags represent our people. This symbolizes fraternity. It symbolizes the brotherhood of the Kurdish, Arab and Turkish people. Is there any relationship with Barzani? We are not related to any form and person, including Barzani. I want to go back to the previous topic. Flags represent nations. The flag of Kurdistan does not only represent one person. It represents the Kurdish people. This picture represents the brotherhood of the people living in the region. What is their relationship with ENKS? We have no relation with ENKS. We have no relationship with any party. What are your thoughts on Barzani and ENKS? We as Syrian Kurds can only represent us. Kurds from Iraq or anywhere else can’t represent the Syrian Kurdish people. What are the goals of the Independent Kurdish Council? Do you plan to join the Syrian National Coalition? Our first goal is the preservation of the unity of Syria. Our second goal is to ensure peaceful lives for all Syrians. We have no other demand than that the Syrian Kurdish people and the other societies in Syria should live in peace. We are not behind any political positions. Our only goal is to enable a peaceful life for everyone. Neither the Syrian National Coalition nor ENKS has succeeded in truly serving the Syrian people. We want to have a stance in light of the experience of our Turkish brothers. How do you see the situation of the Kurds in Afrin? Some individual crimes are being committed. However, we do not consider any of them to a certain group and see them as individual crimes. Individual crimes can’t be equated to anyone; neither to the Turks nor the Arab or the Turkmens. The responsibility of a crime does only belong to the individual committing it. How many Kurds are living in Afrin and how many Kurds left the area? More than half of the current population of Afrin is Kurds. We are connecting to the people who left their homes and went to the areas of the PKK. Whenever they decide to come back, the PKK is preventing them from doing so. They are using these people as a political bargain chip. They constantly propagate to the media that the Kurdish people are not allowed to return home, but in reality, it is they who are preventing the people. They are using these families as a political card and propaganda against Turkey. Is there anything you want to add? I want to underline this following message that I am very thankful for the Turkish state, its government and its people. I want to thank them for my person and for the council I am representing. We want to say to them that we are together. Our blood and the Turkish blood have been mixed on the Syrian soil. We have given martyrs for the safety and security of both nations. I want to declare my utmost respect for any Kurd, Arab, Turkmen and Turk who has become a martyr in the struggle for the freedom of Syria. The Kurdish, Arab and Turkish people want to be together.

This interview was conducted by Ömer Özkizilcik Kinan al Nahhas is an independent member of the Syrian opposition, close to the armed groups in Idlib, and former member of the Leadership Council of the National Liberation Front. What do you think about the agreement? Actually, we don’t know the details of the agreement yet, we hope to have a more detailed understanding soon. It’s clear that they stopped the bombing of Idlib. It is a problem for us not knowing the details, at the least the part that affects us in Idlib and Aleppo. A lot of the people are worried about the details. We have 1 million refugees and they won’t go back to their homes to stay under the regime’s control. Until we know the details, we can’t know the benefits or the risks and threats of this agreement. The Turkish government announced several times that they demand the withdrawal of the regime to the frontlines of the Sochi agreement. After they announced the latest agreement, no one talked about it anymore. This is an issue that needs clarification. Are the security corridor and the joint patrols implementable? This is the second point that raised concerns. The agreement talks about the M4 but didn’t mention the M5 highway which is under regime control. There will be a security corridor for the M4 but there is no mention of the M5 road. It will be difficult for Syrians in Idlib to welcome Russian patrols and the idea of a security corridor only on the M4, which the M5 was captured by the Russians and the regime despite the Sochi agreement, there must be a balance and the Sochi agreement in regards to the demarcations has to be respected. At the moment we have a security corridor for M4 but nothing for M5. What will the armed groups in Idlib do in regards to the agreement? There is great coordination between Turkey and the revolutionary armed groups, and they will come to an agreement but all this will be closely linked to the future of our lands and if the Sochi agreement will be respected or not. Recovering the M5 is a necessity for us, and our Turkish partners perfectly understand that and take it into account. What is the position of HTS? I think HTS is in a sticky situation. They are the major responsible for the last loss in the battle against the regime and I think they are not in a situation to negotiate or impose conditions. They are currently trying to find a way out, but they made it very difficult due to their actions. People in Syria see them as the main responsible party for weakening the revolutionary armed groups and by providing excuses to Russia to bomb Idlib. So they don’t have any allies left in Syria, and the vast majority of the population is against them. But they need a way out, and they are trying to change their narrative. Turkey can play a big role in deciding the fate of HTS, in a way that minimizes the damage. Do you see HTS dissolving itself soon? I hope that but I don’t think they will do it now. It is difficult for them to do it after what they have done in the recent 3-4 years but, but if this was to happen, it will have to be as part of a Syrian led initiative to dissolve and absorb HTS. We have to take into account that the group is not keen on the ideology anymore. Does HTS fear revenge? Maybe in some cases duo the elevated number of injustices and crimes they have committed against Syrians, but this isn’t the reason why they rejected offers in the past to dissolve. Their priority is control and power. Do you think the current ceasefire is a fragile or a lasting one? Turkey is trying its best to make it a real ceasefire, but the problem is Russia. Russia never respected any ceasefire agreement before, in fact, they didn’t respect any agreement at all. The information that we have about the agreement does not reflect any details about how it will be monitored and protected, and it leaves the door open for attacks from the Russian side. I think it is very possible that a confrontation might happen soon due to the actions of the regime, Russia and Iran. Turkey and we should be ready for that. After the Turkish drone strikes why could the regime recapture Saraqip? The Turkish attack was very effective, and shocked the regime; for the first time since the beginning of the revolution the regime had to face airstrikes, and we all realized how weak they are. In just 3 days the regime lost control over its command structure in the battlefronts but they have received heavy help from Hezbollah and Iranian militias on the ground, and the Russian air cover. We know that Hezbollah has sent 500 elite forces, the Radwan forces, only to Saraqip. Meanwhile, Russia continued its airstrikes against the armed groups. Therefore we have seen the retake by the Russian and the militias. We are talking about two different types of attacks. The Turks were attacking with drones; the Russians used Sukhoi, tanks, and everything. Why was the armed Syrian opposition so weak? It is not correct to say they were weak. What we have seen last month was the ninth month of continuous battle. Our groups remained steadfast at the frontlines for several months. After losing the fronts we had many military and human difficulties. The Syrian revolution is the only army in the world that consists only of volunteers. The majority of these volunteers have their families close to the frontline. A lot of them were forced to leave the front to save their families and went back to the war. We are fighting against the regime, Russia and Iran and sectarian groups from Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere simultaneously. What we have seen the last month is not one month but the last month of a long battle. If we look from a different point of view, the regime army was severely shaken and damaged after 3 days of drone strikes. We sustained 8 years of airstrikes from the regime and later Russia. The resistance of the Syrian people is a true miracle. What should be done in Idlib? Idlib cannot be seen in isolation from the Syrian conflict as a whole. The problem is not only Idlib, but it’s also the regime and the future of the entire country. For Idlib, and in the short term, we need to achieve the ceasefire but according to the demarcations before the last wave of attack, and create the necessary conditions for the return of displaced people to their homes in Idlib. This should be the first step before any discussion about reactivating the political track or the opening of the M4 and M5 highways. We need to think about the people and their security first. We also need to be aware that Russia is and has always been keen on achieving a military victory rather than a negotiated solution, and they will continue in their efforts until they see sufficient resilience and strength from our side, Turkey and the Syrian revolution. Turkey must see that their real strategically in this war are the Syrian rebels and opposition, and we should work on making this alliance stronger and more effective.

Who is Abu Khaled al Suri? Abu Khaled al Suri was born 1963 in Aleppo. He was known as Sheikh Umayr, but his real name is Muhammed el Bahai. Abu Khaled al Suri took part within the islamist opposition in the 70s and 80s, and left Syria after the Hama incidents. After his years in Algeria and Afghanistan, Abu Khaled al Suri returned back to Syria and joined the Syrian opposition in 2011. He took part in the formation of Ahrar al Sham. Abu Khaled al Suri was killed on 23 February 2014 by an allegedly Daesh attack against the leadership of Ahrar al Sham. How we attained his diary? I attained part of the diary of Abu Khaled al Suriy via a Syrian opposition fighter who wanted to remain autonomous for the safety of himself and his family. Additionally I have to say that this is only a part of the diary of Abu Khaled al Suri. I received a handwritten copy of his original diary, and therefore hasn’t received the original diary handwritten by Abu Khaled Suri himelf. With my work, this text will be firstly published, and translated into Arabic and English. By publishing this, I hope to provide additional information about Ahrar al Sham, the political view of Abu Khaled al Suri and his view and relations to Al-Qaeda. I hope that this will contribute to the literature.B Kutluhan Görücü To read the original in Arabic click here. First: Absence of strategy and comprehensive pre-planning The early Mujahideen did not have the right vision to establish the military jihadi line, ie, a strategic vision based on an accurate calculation of the facts and expectations of the future, and it was not taken into consideration as a serious study of the country’s situation, geography, demographic geography, religious, national and political structure, And the nature of the regime and hostile and friendly forces and their data, and the possibility of benefiting from them to the other important things that should have been taken into account, and based on the nature of the appropriate military action, and the nature of the structure of the organization required ….. etc. On the contrary, the work prevailed almost instinctively in which necessities were always determined according to the facts of the status quo, and soon emerged from the hands of planners once the events had been exploaded, and the events dragged their planners through a series of necessities and choose the lesser evil. When the matter came out of the hands of the forefront and became in the hand of the leadership of the outside, and it was not a part of the unplanned work less than the previous stage, despite the availability of time and possibilities and circumstances and support of the dialogue, the leadership was unable to lead and to work to the strategic level, but on the contrary it (the leadership) relied on the income data and built its dreams of resolution on them, and missed the strategy even on the preparation and training programs, and maybe the people of insid (and we mean: the field leadership)  Hama, Damascus and the officers were the first to think of giving the work a strategic curve, but their fatal mistake was thier relying on the external factors and its supporting, drove them out of the game, and threw them into the destruction. And because of the absence of this strategic important action in the planning of a revolutionary guerrilla war, the events have been controlled by the effectiveness of all military attempts,  and despite all the wonderful individual tournaments it was led to the failure of the Mujahideen, and they could not do anything but only give evidence of their ability to martyrdom. Second:  The fragmentation of the loyal Mujahideen in various organizations and various loyalties It was is very late to understand the issue, and we are still somewhat far from correcting it and pushing it to its normal path. This is perhaps the first duty to establish a distinctive jihadist line. The scene was filled by the factor of principles, regulations and loyalties between those who struggled through a prior perception and those who had been pushed  into it out of fear and disbelief and those who had been compelled to go back to it … etc, and that leads to the presence of a complex human form in the rules of the organizations that have become concerned with this matter … Unfortunately, the true Mujahideen themselves have also split in this context. Thus the Mujahideen found themselves believing in the revolutionary Jihadist armed action, and in the same time into a various organizations and under various leaders, which make them  loose the  (echo) of this believing flame in the people who carry it, and the concentration of effort in one curve. It has gone beyond this, because the struggles and the sad atmosphere sometimes resulted in an atmosphere of shipments and partisan hatred even among the youth Mujahideen who hold the same thought and the same spirit and the same goal, and that only because of their presence under the leadership of different stripes of conflicting objectives. and above this differentiate of fragmentation of religious and moral negative reflections, in many ways, it leads to be a strategic factor that is not enough to benefit from. Thirdly, the inability to explain a revolutionary jihadist theory and a clear set of ideological goals: “The establishment of Islamic rule and the war against Nusairis”  it was the slogan of all those who were found in a conglomeration of Islamic blocs that became involved in this conflict. One of the first axioms that must be used is a revolutionary organization that addresses the leadership of the masses, Unfortunately, the true Mujahideen failed to put such a thought, goal, and slogan in a clear and deliberate direction through a media plan (clear), at least so that (those who perish would perish by clear evidence, and those who survive would survive by clear evidence)[1]. It was the best that had been understood by the masses, or by those who only cared about the events, there is a group of young Islamists fighting this regime and most of them understood that they want to establish an Islamic rule, Without addressing the understanding of what forms this provision? And why this war was for? What is the extent of its hypothesis? And why do they call for participation and death in its path? The Mujahideen could not exactly make the people understand who they were? What do they want?  And what motivates them? (On the contrary, those who spied on this movement and the revolution, first thing they did was that they came out to show people what they want and what their goals are … etc, like the parties of the National Alliance, for example …) Although this explanation was and remains the basis of attracting the masses and mobilizing the rules of intellectual and doctrinal payment for this dangerous work. Fourth: the shallow political and revolutionary awareness and the low level of forensic science as a whole With the exception of some members of the Mujahideen leadership and some of the bases, most of those who responded to this fierce revolutionary war were characterized by a low level of political awareness of the dimensions of this revolutionary game. Because the imperfection is impermissible in the rules, its danger gets greater and greater when it becomes one of the characteristics of the leadership of the labor administration, and thus the ignorance of the nature of this revolutionary act of purely political substance, as the war in all its details is nothing but a tool for this revolutionary political direction adopted by the work. The ignorance of this matter leaves the leadership unable to develope any scheme of an integrated strategic nature at all levels, and even the rules and the leaders of the middle levels of peoples should gain the understanding because it is that will decide the future leaders in a way that consumes its cadres step by step, and because their understanding of this matter explains the justification of the leadership in the development of their perceptions, and makes them call for a greater path that this awareness of this concept was shallow, and rarely demonstrated by individuals who have walked this path at various levels. The level of forensic science in general, especially in the Mujahideen bases, and after the disasters of successive citations of the elite segment of the elite Mujahideen in the first shock, and the Islamic groups have relied on the quantitative mobilization of individuals. And this level became low, which leads to the first role in those conspiracies that passed easily, and could control these rules, which became the tongue that recognizes the delivery and confidence of some of the men working in it; where they understand what we do not understand, and therefore many abuses occurred, and many plots passed under this ignorance Semi-mass. In short, the majority of these Mujahideen were distinguished by the rush and the stalemate. This is true, but the level of awareness on the scientific and legal level was shallow, and far less than what must be found in the ranks of revolutionary jihadi groups. Fifth: relying on quantity after the first strike went by the elites: For the vanguard and the Mujahideen of the inside, the first shock, from the 1970s to the late 1980s, took them in a tragic series of citations. Therefore, those leaders were implicated in opening the door of organizing in front of the masses to expand their base. The quantity exceeded the genre and negative and fatal phenomena emerged later; Because many of those who joined the path were not deeply rooted in the path of stability and Islamic commitment. They were characterized only by the enthusiasm and the rush that followed the decline of events, especially going out of the boarders…   On the level of the Muslim Brotherhood, the blow of arrests has gone with the beginning of the bombing of the events of thousands of cadres  that had been prepared in the education and training corners, and opened the door after their departure outside the borders in front of polarization and assimilation of every slices of the community, which showed signs unclear in the ranks of some rules, and unfortunate and shameful signs in some separate incidents. The negative of this quantitative buildup had been icreased  by the situation inside the country that has not been conducive to the preparation of these masses, raising them and raising their scientific, legal and political standing, and preparing them appropriately, but necessarily. On the other hand, the failure of the Brotherhood in terms of education and preparation was no less than their failure on the level of military action, and despite the survival of hundreds of elements in the bases, the leadership has not succeeded in preparing a successful educational program at the level of the case except for the boring classic Islamic party lessons that had been held every now and then. And some theoretical military training programs were insufficient, not to mention that the atmosphere of the quantitative crowd of Syrian intelligence has made it possible for agents to enter the atmosphere of conflict in order to push the enemy and attract the elements that the organizations obtained. Sixth: The weakness of the internal and external media of the Mujahideen: We have already talked about the failure of the Mujahideen in crystallizing an idea that people understand by a set of goals and slogans that they were aware of in their work. This was a part of their media failure, with the exception of certain statements that were set for specific purposes. There was no planned media plan to mobilize the masses and expand the revolutionary base of the supporters. As leadership of the Brotherhood abroad took over, the media had been neglected on a foreign scale, but was involved in intimidation and culminated in the accompanying of  Hama events and the prognosticate of the (preacher)[i][2], and it was more news media than intellectual media directed to invade the hearts of supporters at home and abroad. The result of such shortcomings is not hidden on the foresight, the failure to make the rivers of blood  run in vain, despite the existence of thousands of loyalists, and reaping only the epithets of martyrdom. The lesson of the failure of the jihadist media was an unforgettable lesson. Seventh: the Mujahedeen waiting for support from outside parties continuously, and not relying on self confıdence: That was a complete line destroyed the vanguard inside, then it destroyed the Mujahideen crowd abroad, and then destroyed the field command and the military administration officers in Hama and Damascus (what was called: plan of decisiveness). All those involved in the jihadist administration have been involved in relying on hostile regimes in the neighborhood (such as Iraq). The revolution expanded and widened and its costs increased in a cancerous manner, that ecceded the transient flow of the neighborhood of money, weapons and supplies, as happened to the vanguard and then to the leadership of Hama and the officers, and the tragedy that took place was one of the greatest lessons. A revolutionary jihadist movement and a comprehensive guerrilla war can not rely on funding and arming its members and dependents except on themselves, and what they draw from their borders. They must lay out plans for this matter in a clear and detailed manner. Otherwise, it will become a political playing card in the hands of others. It was a hard lesson came to be understood late, and to be considered! Eighth: The Involvement in a form of long-term guerrilla warfare does not suit the country: Perhaps this is one of the mistakes of non-strategic planning, or never planning rather, and develop perceptions based on the daughters of pure ideas, its readiness from reality and its facts. The insight into the nature of the country, its geography, its demographic geography, the composition of the religious, ethnic and psychological population, and the knowledge and study of the status and structure of the sectarian sectarian system are sufficient for the student to take a military plan with this hostile regime, and to adopt a method other than that which was adopted and followed by those who do not consider first by their experiences, and the experience of others. It was sufficient and possible at one time and with the onset of events to topple the regime through targeted strikes aimed at its main pillars and active personalities, and some successful operations have proved the possibility. In the aftermath of the assassination attempt on the President twice – the bombing of the Council of Ministers – Admiral Air – artillery, on the contrary, the Mujahideen began to involve themselves in a long-term war whıch was unequal, a war of attrition between poor, weak and strong rich in the country of the maze, it was one of the results of the work that was not studied, Non-strategic, and another lesson in that sad series of lessons. Ninth: the long-term transition and the loss and supply of the masses, and the religious and revolutionary low level of individuals: The reasons and nature of transition from the country were varıed, ranging from escape from crawling to necessity and all according to the situation and this is not the area of ​​our research here. But the transfer of jihadist staffs to the outside, and the arrange for their lives in the House of the Diaspora and Rabat, especially in Iraq and Jordan or abandoned the entire arena of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Europe lost the revolution friction with the masses, and thus cut off the natural periods of material and human potential and moral turned into a very small isolated body in the phase of erosion, All the levels, the loss of elements that are not compensated through the military operations carried out from the outside to the inside is a form of erosion, and the despirateof  some of the Mujahideen and their migration to the arena of Rabat,  and the preparation to search for their lives ler to their corrosion .. Etc. Little by little, Dar al-Hijra has become a living place, not an exceptional stage,the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood contributed greatly to the establishment of this painful situation and drew many of its members to study or work and marriage. At one time it was not in the foreseeable future to develop a plan to return the Mujahideen inside through the program thoughtfully, the vanguard themselves have been involved in this to a great extent. And that the general trend for all was the stability of all those who came out of the Mujahideen, and the affected members of them abroad, and arranged his life there as a long life. Tenth: The lack of benefit from the experiences of Islamic and global guerrilla wars: History is full of experiences, sciences and human experiences, all based on the human balance of the total activities of this organism in various fields. Wars and revolutionaries do not differ from this rule. For this and other reasons, the Qur’an and the Sunnah have propelled us in this logical direction, to seek knowledge and extrapolating of the  true lesson … The period after the tragedy has allowed us to demand and learn about rich Islamic and international experiences and researches. Islamic and non-Islamic peoples have gone through similar conditions to which we have passed and written important books and studies. If they had been briefed by some of the authorities, they would not be involved into similar pitfalls. This was a form of ignorance that characterized our people. Most of our people do not read or clearly look. Many things were handled in a random and random way, while there were many rich experiences of Muslim and non-Muslim nations, studied and codified and accessibled to those who wanted to know and learn.  But no onehad clearly seen, and we had to pass in this maze to discover ourselves even the simplest bumps,  and we wished that we wake up and learn from experience. Eleventh: Dealing with systems as a permanent dam: (Nothing written) Twelveth: Public action abroad It was a serious mistake of a double losing result, we were at home managing our battle as an organization or as secret organizations depending on the fact and battle, and as soon as we went to the neighborhood, the situation changed dramatically, and without any cause! Almost all the organizations have been transformed into public action under the host regimes. It is true that these regimes (hostile in reality) would not accept our hospitality as hidden secret gatherings without understanding a minimum of what we do and what we want, but much public conduct was indispensable. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in this, especially in Iraq and Jordan, has gone to far limits, such as revealing our numbers, the names of our members, our intentions, our capabilities and our plans, as well as in other areas where these fleeing crowds did not practice any kind of secrecy. These were the most dangerous secrets, Its owners know with certainty that they have been observed and even sometimes they speak to the observer. It was a certain madness! But in those circumstances no one was listening to the wise opinion! So we gave the neighboring enemy systems full detailed information about us in everything. Everything and no need to count! They had introduced us to our truth, underestimated us, and knew how to surround us and participate in our strangulation,  And the security coordination that took place at some stages between Jordan, Syria and Iraq, and so on, was not hidden of anyone. On the other hand, we stabbed the other Islamic organizations in the neighboring countries, where their intelligence services who were interested In the war of fundamentalist Islamic terrorists, they took a great lesson and learned how to fight them and direct strikes through their study of the movement of their peers, even their peers, and no power except with God Almighty. Thirteenth: The external military failure, and loss of ability to deter the enemy and its friends: While in the interior, the vanguard did not have any time or any possibility of thinking about any foreign military action, and after they went abroad they partly thought about this, and then dismissed, the brothers have formed this by claiming a device independent of the external work device, but it was dead like other devices because of a loss of intention to work. Elderly disable sheikhs control the electricity of all appliances, and they cut it into maturity. The failure of those involved in this matter to give it the right, caused the regime to be greedy of us, and pushed it to the point of besieging us and banding in our ranks, and directing teams of assassinations and monitoring from time to time  to monitor our leaders and those who were active among us, and even went to kill some of our members and effectiveness abroad! In front of the hearing and sight of the whole world! There was no example, no plan or intention to deter the enemy abroad. It was true that the battlefield was Syria, but such a deterrent capability was necessary even in our new home. On the other hand, many of the Arab, Islamic and other regimes have claimed us by supporting our enemy materially, morally and informally! It was sufficent that at the time when we were suffering from the killing and destruction and the horrors of war, Arab oil money has been treacherous flowing on our Nusairi ASSAD to turn into shots penetrating the hearts of our Muslim nation and to build blocks of  oppressive prisons and injustice where our symptoms were violated! Billions of dollars from The Gulf Islamic countries has poured into the occupied Nusairi regime, which has unanimously agreed of all of the Gulf’s scholars and wisemen … but it was the interests, andthat needed to be solved and detered even by threatening!, but it did not happen. There have been balances of forces and interests did not belong to the jihad must be taken into account! And so was the contradiction and the lesson because the Mujahideen had no power to deter! … Fourteenth: Absence of any perception of the stage after the fall of the regime if it happened by us or by others: This was one of the results of unstudied planning or of no-planning, rather. We were fighting an enemy controlled by the existence of intertwined factors, some international and some regional and some internal … It could have fallen by us or the act of others … And this would create a new circumstance which was not taken into concideration, and no longer has any plan or any vision, so, what about those who do not know how to plan for the post-war! But it was another lesson that must be taken into account: how our position will be towards a sudden coup … towards a sudden fall … how will we deal with the neighborhood, with the blocs, with the groups, with the distribution of our required forces, etc. There was no such a thing to be taken into account. Fifteenth: Not to circumvent the faithful and sincere scholars and benefit them: This was a mistake on both sides of the Mujahideen and the scholars. The scholars of that time have turned their backs on this path and covered up in their private retreat, especially in Saudi Arabia, as if nothing had been left, and they left the determinations  in the hands of halve and quarter of scholars, and those who do not belong to the forensic science have to deal with the leadership of the Islamic Movement and Jihad. The Mujahideen did not give this matter enough attention to the scholars, enlightened in their opinion, working with their advice and giving them their right, so it was a compromise on both sides and a close relationship between the scholar and the worker … The arena has been free of working scientists, and it was necessary to unify the effort of the scholar and the worker,i.e, the trusted scholar and the sincerly worker, but none of this has happened, and the path has deviated, the transgressions have occurred, and the ignorant have been awakened to this fatal error, and perhaps the time is enough for reform. Sixteenth: Not benefiting from all the Islamic sectors in the country in terms of mobilization in the revolution, especially the tribes of the desert and the Kurds: It was naturally an Islamic revolution of universal and comprehensive goals, meaning every Muslim in this country, and since the extension of the invitation is an extension of concentration, not horizontally .. In the sense that it focused in cities and sectors limited social segments and did not spread throughout the arena, this reflected negatively on the jihadist movement And neglected important sectors that could be entered into the battle and crucially all were Muslim sectors committed to some extent and sympathetic to Islam, especially the surrounding countryside in the cities, tribes in the desert, and Kurds in the north, Thus the Mujahideen failed to mobilize these sectors, and the state was able to recruit most of them through seduction, threat and low interests. And others, especially our Kurdish Muslim brothers, have fallen prey to the deviant ideas of the expatriate to achieve their identity, which is denied by all the oppressive unjust society … We have lost a strong public support, and it was one of the successful lessons not to study the arena and management from its data and planning comprehensively for it… Seventeenth: The inability to turn the Islamic civil and advocacy organizations into military capable of resistance and self-defense organizations: It is perhaps the most important lesson that mean our brothers in the advocacy organizations in the Islamic and Arab Countries. The battle has exploded somewhat abruptly, but a large segment of the Islamists, especially the leadership, knew that this battle was inevitable and those great leaders did not take any preparation or planning. Those cadres were the victims of the arrest. The cadres who had survived failed in mobilizing themselves as military combat cadres. They carried with them all the peaceful mosque methods apply to  the military action, and the faılure of the scholarwas very huge as he wore the uniform of the commandant . It is strange to see and hear organizations raising the banner of jihad and death in the name of ALLAH, which is the greatest of its aspirations, and leave its bases over decades of education and training unable to take up arms! Failed to prepare even a travel document for a sudden disaster, and to return saving dirham for a difficult day. It was a weak sheep gatherings that soon came to the butcher’s knife, And for the next few years, the failure of the possibility of mobilizing such a class has proved a sudden and rapid military mobilization … This is a lesson … a lesson for all the Islamic organizations that leave Jihad and wait for the day of the incident to reconsider their structure and composition, and the extent of their readiness for that day, or let them declare rest and moderation, not growing on themselves and the Muslims, and then provide those thousands of victims who trusted Sheikh  to the junta or detained under the slogan: (the seventyest) Eighteen: Along with those harsh lessons we had some useful lesson: The events proved the possibility of mobilizing the Muslim masses in favor of a jihadist Islamic revolution, in condition of providing the example and good example of sacrifice and courage and proof of the ability to fight tyranny, and a year and a half of military jihad in a relationship carried hundreds of thousands of Muslims to go out to the streets calling for the life of jihad and Islam and the fall of the regime and tyranny, and the demand for weapons to participate in the honor of jihad, and the experience of Hama proved that the thousands of Muslims responded to the call of jihad and fought side by side with our Mujahideen brothers … Also, events had proved that our people are benevolent people, soon the leadership of the Mujahideen, which emerged from within the people, and distinguished military cadres on the command and soldier level, reached the ranks of this people, which the puppet authorities forcibly removed from gun and manhood and Islamic equestrian morality. , And a review in the records of our heroes and martyrs may ALLAH bless and accept them assures thıs point … This is a unique successor in the Muslim  generous people, and  a hope in ALLAH and then in a future of a similar tender. [1] . Anfal suresi (42) [2].  ıt was  anewspaper for the Syrian Muslims Brotherhood organization

Interview with President of the Syrian Turkmen Assembly Dr. Muhammad Wajih Juma Born in 1960 in Aleppo’s district Manbij, Dr. Muhammad Wajih Juma is a member of a Turkmen family of rural Jerabulus. By profession, he is a surgeon/medical doctor. Dr. Juma served as the chief physician of the Manbij Public Hospital from 1995 to 2003, and from then until 2011 as head of the department of General Surgery at Aleppo’s El Razi Hospital. Between 2010 and 2012, he served as president of the Aleppo Chamber of Physicians. Taking on an active role in Syria’s political opposition in the wake of the revolutionary movement, Dr. Muhammad Wajih Juma was appointed to the position of Health Minister of the Syrian Interim Government in 2014, as which he remained until 2016. Dr. Muhammad Wajih Juma also served as the founding president of the Syrian Turkmen National Movement Party between 2014 and 2017. He has been serving as the President of the Syrian Turkmen Council since February 10, 2018. For more information about Dr. Muhammed Wajih Juma and the Syrian Turkmen Council, please click:  M. Wajih Juma : http://en.suriyegundemi.com/dr-muhammed-wajih-juma-president-syrian-turkmen-assembly/  The Syrian Turkmen Council : http://en.suriyegundemi.com/the-syrian-turkmen-assembly/  Interview: Kutluhan Görücü, Ömer Özkızılcık When did the Turkmen presence in Syria begin and in which regions of Syria do they live? The existence of Turkmens in Syria is at least 1000 years; the most important proof of this is the Suleyman Shah Tomb. The state founded by the Seljuks was also centered in Aleppo. Before the Seljuks, the Turkmens were also present in the region, but this was in a military way, they were with the Abbasids. And these regions were at peace after the Turks came, before the Turks there was no understanding of giving importance to people. The Turks had the understanding of “Let people alive, so that the state alive.” Turkmens are found in almost every region of Syria, but there is also our presence especially in Aleppo, Bayir Bucak, Hama, Homs, Damascus and its rural areas and also in Raqqa. In Tel Abyad, we have many villages in the area, especially in Hamam Turkmen. There are also Golan Turkmens, Golan Turkmens have relatives in Sivas, and after they came here, when they met with eachother, they came up with very nice images. How does the Syrian Turkmen Council carry out its activities? And do you have any effort for the return of the Syrian Turkmens? We are preparing ourselves to return home. We launched a campaign for the return of Syrian Turkmens in March of this year. When we visited the camps, we received very good feedback, but of course there is no possibility of 100% return. Because, here, we have jobs or educational facilities to stay in Turkey. But our main goal is return home. In Syria, our numerical existence has not been a simple entity throughout history. We are a society that builds the civilization of Syria, there is a trace of a Turkmen in every corner of Syria. We also have the blood of our ancestors and martyrs. We will not leave Syria to anyone. The Syrian Turkmen Council has now moved into Syria, and now we have an office in Cobanbey. We currently have 8 non-governmental organizations and 3 cultural centers in the region. We have also started language courses teaching Turkish. Homs Turkmens were also deported and came to these regions, how are their situations and do you connect with them? In fact, our communication with them has existed since they were under siege. We are very sorry because of their exit, the international situation has brought them to this point, and they are mostly in the area of the Operation of the Olive Branch and we have very close connections with them. We’re always visiting, and we’re going there. With the support of  Turkey and Turkey’s NGOs, we want to keep them in a reasonable condition but the only thing that will satisfy them is their return to their homeland. I hope it won’t be long before they leave the country. With a general solution in Syria, these people will return to their homeland. From your point of view, what should be the general solution in Syria and do you have the steps to be taken as the Syrian Turkmen Council? In fact, the Syrians rebelled for the implementation of democracy and law. If there is no democratic transition, this revolution does not achieve its purpose. We want to be listed in the constitution as a founding element of Syria. Some people look at citizenship enough, but we clearly want to take part in the constitution. You do not have a separatist agenda in Syria; you defend the territorial integrity of Syria and a free Syrian state. So, do you want the Syrian Turkmens in the constitution to have the right to education in the mother tongue? Do you have any expectations for this? In fact, some say that if you take your cultural rights, it is enough. But we want all rights of a society, not just our cultural rights. We want to have a share in the important decisions of Syria, we want our political rights. The issue of language is now a very democratic and principal issue. Mother tongue is a topic that should not be discussed. We want more than just our cultural rights, and we struggle in the political and international arena to get all of our rights, and we have an important presence on the ground. And of course, we have Turkey, thank to God. While talking about the constitution, decisions were taken to start the constitution process at the Istanbul summit. How does the process of the Constitutional Commission work? Do you take part as the Syrian Turkmen Council? We have a different view on our constitution. According to the UN Security Council resolution, that is, according to the decision no. 2254, there will be a political transition and then the constitution is written. But international powers, let’s start with the constitution, they say. This situation is not very correct for us, we say yes because it is an international alliance. However, we do not find the timing of the constitution issue right. Let’s say the constitution has been written, and this constitution will be approved by Bashar Assad? There is no transition process with Assad. Do you have a problem with Assad’s personality, or here with the Baath regime and system? If there is an alternative to Assad from the Baath regime, can you accept it? Again I say, we want a democratic system. If Assad goes as the name and the Ba’ath remains, we go to the same dictatorship system. Assad doesn’t even have control at the moment; he is taking instructions from the Russians or the Iranians. In addition, now 40-45% of Syria is not in the hands of Assad.  In case of the Baath regime remains in power, how do you see Turkey’s defacto ‘Free Syria’ state model in the area from Morek to the east of the Euphrates? We can only accept this as the first step, but we are considering a future that covers all of Syria. But from here, very logical and beautiful step can be taken. In fact, this process has started, Manbijis want Afrin and Jarablus model. Idlib, believe me, is more willing than any other. In later times, Hama sand Homs also wants. Gradually everywhere in Syria become emancipated, with Turkey’s support, of course. Let me tell you one key thing; Syrian revolution without the support of Turkey is zero, zero in every aspect. 4-4.5 million in Idlib, Afrin or Jarabulus and, 3.5-4 million people in Turkey lives under the Turkey’s control. Nearly half of the people of Syria is under the Turkey’s custody. Some people say where Turkey will be in the future of Syria. Turkey currently is both in the field and at the table. Now Syria is nothing without Turkey. Different from politics, as a social question, is there a tension or friction with other elements of Syrian society because Turkmens are preceded by Turkey? No, there is not. As I said before Turkey looked equally to everyone. As the aids came, they were distributed equally to everyone in Syria. We have also contributed to this issue, when we received help, we demanded that other elements prioritized. Because our project was where all the people live, we live. There are people who are our neighbours for hundreds of years. No one can break that. We have an understanding of giving importance to people. Has the influence of selefist waves in Syria had an impact on the Syrian Turkmens? If so, how are the Syrian Turkmens affected? We have adopted, moved and spread the religion of Islam throughout history. Therefore, I can say that there is almost no such influence on the Syrian Turkmens. We have never approached Nusra and Daesh. I can say that the most durable society in Syria is Turkmens. Now, we have fought against them and won. Now we will give an ideological war and we want to be an example to these people, to share our values with these people. Currently in Manbij Turkey and the US are patrolling together and if conditions develop, do you have any idea to turn? Also, will the Turkmen troops take part in the transfer of the Suleyman Shah Tomb to the old place or a possible operation to the east of the Euphrates? Actually, I wanted to start with that. Suleyman Shah Tomb must be moved to the old place and we will protect the tomb as Turkmens. To the east of the Euphrates must definitely be crossed, because there are many places where terrorists have established nests, along the border. They need to be cleaned. There is now a great hatred and uprising against YPG in the east of the Euphrates. We have a different point of view on Manbij. Manbij must be governed by Manbijis. But they will need a brother, he is also Turkey. Manbijis people want the Euphrates Shield model. We don’t want America. I’m going to say it clearly, it’s the USA who brought PYD to our city and make us occupied by them. We Manbijis, we can make the management, we make the security well but we will need the support of Turkey. As a last question, what do you think of the possible operation of the Tel Abyad? We are used that what Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan says comes true. Mr. Erdogan said that there would be no terror in these regions. I think these operations should go to Kandil, the head of the snake must be crushed. What happened in Afrin can happen there, even more easily. How people threw away PYD from Afrin they can do it there.

Interview with Hussam Tarsha, member of the political office of the National Front for Liberation M. Hussam Tarsha (Abu Omar): Member of the Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front and Director of External Relations in Ahrar al Sham Interviewer: Ömer Özkizilcik 1) How do you see the Sochi Agreement? Answer: This Agreement received by all the institutions of the people’s revolution and events and people in the north with satisfaction. We have shown our reservations about the Russian presence in areas of heavy disarmament whether police or monitor. The Turkish brothers understood this reservation. We support Turkey’s efforts in this regard. We seek to consolidate that this will be a permanent agreement to move toward a comprehensive political solution in accordance with UN resolutions, in particular resolution 2,455 building on the political transition, which guarantees the success of the efforts of the work of the constitutional committee in order to make the road map for the political process of the feasibility of achieving the aspirations of the Syrian people, and end the state of tyranny in Syria. 2) Since Sochi’s deal has changed in Idlib? Answer: Nothing has changed at the level of the revolutionary movement through the preparation and processing of any future military benefit and strengthen, the revolution and its forces. The heroic Syrian people have no confidence in the Russian side due to the previous experiences in violation of pledges and agreements. Many areas, especially in the areas of Hama and villages close to the frontlines, have seen the return of civilians. You can see the reports of the Syrian response coordinators who have details in this regard, which we have seen through the media and have seen good efforts to build on. 3) What are your main concerns about the demilitarized zone? Will you implement it? Answer: The fundamental concern about the region lies in three issues: First: The fear of a betrayal of the regime instigated by the Russians or the Russians directly and this must be prevented by the existence of guarantees by the brothers in Turkey. Second: There are discussions in some detailed points but they are not affecting the essence of the agreement. We support this agreement and we thank the Turkish leadership represented by Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan for the intensive efforts he has made for the interests of both Turkey, Free Syria and its people. Third: The fears of the Russians confirm that it is a temporary agreement. There is a reminder of the previous de-escalation areas that ended with the capture of Russians and the regime. 4) Are there any developments on the side of the regime in line with the Sochi agreement? Answer: The regime invests in this agreement by listing what it deems to be a temporary agreement and and that the issue of extending their control is only a matter of time! The violations by the regime have been recorded since the date of the agreement in Sochi. 5) What do you think of the Turkish role in Idlib? Answer: The role of Turkey is essential, and it serves as a pole to achieve any of the aspirations of the rebellious people of Syria. The revolutionary forces all have a consensus on the unique Turkish role and stand in its alliance. It is in the interest of our country and our people to maintain its biggest and best ally in Syria after God and his success. We look forward to further and further support for Syrian satiety, which is worthy of the likes of this inspirational Turkish leadership.

Special Interview: Media Relation responsible of Ahrar al Sham Omran Muhammad Omran Muhammad is part of the political office of Ahrar al Sham and is responsible about media relations of the faction. We interviewed him about recent events in Syria. Interviewer: Ömer Özkizilcik Q: It was known that Ahrar al Sham had a strong presence in the Rastan pocket. What happened to the evacuated fighters of Ahrar al Sham? A: It was not only the Rastan pocket, but the entire northern Homs countryside. Half of the control points and frontlines in northern Homs were manned by Ahrar al Sham and half of the fighters from besieged northern Homs were part of Ahrar al Sham. Evacuated fighters in from northern Homs countryside are presence all over the liberated areas. Idlib, Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield, the northern countryside of Aleppo. Q: Ahrar al Sham and others in the Rastan pocket formed the 4th Corp of the National Army in order to gain political protection. However, the pocket was attacked by Russia, Iran and the Assad regime and it ended in complete surrender. Why hasn’t this attempt achieved its goal? A: The 4th Corp was not formed for the purpose of protection but as a response to the state of evolution of the status of the revolution. The revolution is evolute all the time. For this evolution we formed the 4th Corp and also as a kind of reinforcement and resistance. As a third reason, it was a response to the calling of the Syrian Islamic Council, because those Sheikhs asked to unify the efforts of the faction under the Free National Army. What happened also is that Russia, Iran and the regime insisted in their policy of bombing and their ‘scorched earth’ strategy despite of the Astana outcomes. Russia actually threatened frankly with a destiny similar to the destiny of Ghouta. It is not a surrender actually. Also you can not resist like in Ghouta, because the infrastructure of northern Homs countryside is not similar to the infrastructure to Ghouta. Ghouta, Duma and Harasta are cities, but northern Homs countryside consists of villages. You can’t resist in such areas. All the above mentioned was so clear for the civilians in the area, so they pushed forward to end it without having a massacre like in Ghouta. Also, we wanted finally to pull the troops under an umbrella that is acceptable for the international community, the National Army and not give Russia, Iran and other enemy countries causes to make a war toward the area. Q: Ahrar al Sham formed together with Nureddin Zengi a new unity called Jabhat Tahrir Suriyah. How much is it a real unity? What are the aims of Jabhat Tahrir Suriyah? A: What happened is more like a front than other thing. Maybe it will evolve into a full unity, but after some steps. It is also a kind of effort to unify revolution bases. Maybe it will turn the status from a faction state into one army state. The goals of Jabhat Tahrir Suriyah is creating a kind of one system into the areas that are under their control. After that to make an administrative body from the personals of the revolution in the area to administrate the liberated lands. Q: Jabhat Tahrir Suriyah and Hayat Tahrir al Sham had massive fightings against each other. What is the situation now in Idlib? How is the region affected by this fighting? Do you think Hayat Tahrir al Sham has become weaker? A: The situation is almost quite in Idlib. How we were affecte… Look the are in general become weaker. What happened finally regardless who is right who is wrong, what happened as a final conclusion is a weak point to use all these weapons and ammunitions in an intra fighting instead of to put it in the right way and right direction against Iran, Iranian, Russian and regime forces. Q: Many Syrian rebel brigades formed the National Liberation Front. What is the aim of this formation? How is your stance towards them? Should this formation be considered as attempt to weaken Hayat Tahrir al Sham? A: One of the major faction consisting the National Liberation Front is Faylaq us Sham and it is a good faction. Since the leader of this formation is a supreme officer, it maybe will be a positive point. The aim behind this formation is not weakening HTS, but to unify and collecting the efforts and factions in the liberated areas. Q: Which dynamics are behind the formation of Hurashiddeen and Ansar al Tawheed? How is your view towards them? A: Some personal or some members within HTS consider the changes in the HTS policy towards many files and many problems like Turkey like surrender steps. They defected and formed something different and also they are extremists and they refuse to get away of Al-Qaeda. For these reasons they formed these faction. My point of view is that all these factions should definitely disappear not to be cause for more blood and burn for the people of the liberated areas by the international community. What is required is revolutional and ational faction who work for the revolution goals like liberty, freedom and democracy that are the demands of the early days of the revolution. Q: US State Department officially declared Hayat Tahrir al Sham as a terrorist organization. What is your stance on this and how will it affect Idlib and Syria politics? A: Our attitude and point of view of what happened by the USA is that God is witness that we advised HTS a lot to dissolve HTS and eliminate this name, but no positive response from them. We knew that this classification is like a first step to color all the area by black and it’s a kind of introducing the area into a heavy bombing wave and heavy burning of the area. Q: Regarding the loss of eastern Ghouta, the Rastan pocket and southern Damascus should the Astana process be seen as a failed attempt? A: It is not true to consider Astana meeting as a failure. You have to look as it as a step or a trial to risk you what is remaining of the liberated areas. Once the Astana meetings started, you know that the three countries Iran, Turkey and Russia wanted to stop the fighting and declare a ceasefire, because each of these countries have goals and benefits of ending the fight. This was the main reason of Astana. The main reason of collapsing of those areas like Ghouta and northern Homs is that they were already under siege and away from friends of those areas like rebels and Turkey. So it was not hard to fall down.